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ABSTRACT 
We present here classical minimax inequalities as well as more 
recent ones, as the Ky Fan inequality and its variants, which 
play an important role not only in game theory, but in convex 
and non convex analysis. 
MINIllAX TIIEORY: A SUElMARY 
J e a n - P i e r r e  Aubin 
TWO PERSON GAMES 
L e t  u s  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  two p l a y e r s ,  Mike and Nancy, who have 
t o  choose  " s t r a t e g i e s "  x  and y  i n  " s t r a t e g y  sets" M and N ac-  
c o r d i n g  t o  c e r t a i n  r u l e s  which w e  a r e  abou t  t o  d e s c r i b e .  The 
t r a d i t i o n a l  way t o  ground game t h e o r y  i s  t o  p o s i t  t h a t  e a c h  p l a y e r  
c l a s s i f i e s  p a i r s  of  s t r a t e g i e s  t h r o u g h  a  r e a l  va lued  f u n c t i o n .  
W e  can t h i n k  of  such  a  f u n c t i o n  a s  a  map t h a t  a s s o c i a t e s  t o  e a c h  
p a i r  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  ( x , y )  i t s  " c o s t " ,  measured by a  r e a l  number. 
S i n c e  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  c o s t  i n v o l v e s  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  money, which i s  
q u i t e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m a s t e r  i n  economics,  w e  p r e f e r  t o  c a l l  it a  
" l o s s " .  So a  p l a y e r  u s e s  a  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  f  : M x N - + R  f o r  d e f i n i n g  
t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  p r e o r d e r  on M x N  a s  f o l l o w s :  
( ( x l  , y ,  i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  (x2  , y 2 )  i f  and o n l y  i f  
~ ( X , , Y ~ )  ' f ( x 2 , y 2 )  . 
Whatever t h e  r e l e v a n c e  of  t h i s  assumption i s ,  w e  assume from now 
on t h a t  Mike and Nancy s e l e c t  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
l o s s  f u n c t i o n s  f M  : M  x N + R  and f N  :M x N + R  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Definition 1 
- - 
A pair of strategies (x,y) is said to be a noncooperative 
equilibrium of 
( 3 )  fN ( Z , v )  = min fN (Fly) . 
YEN 
So, a noncooperative equilibrium is a situation in which each 
player optimizes his own criterion, assuming that the choice of 
his partner is fixed. In other words, this is a situation of 
i n d i v i d u a l  s t a b i l i t y .  
We consider here the important case of two-person games that 
satisfy the condition 
So, the loss of Nancy is the gain of Mike and vice versa. 
For simplicity, we set 
( 6 )  fb(x) := sup f(x,y), v' := inf sup f(x,y) 
YEN xEM YEN 
(read f-sharp and v-sharp) and 
(8) b v := sup in£ f(x,y) 
YEN x€M 
(read f-flat and v-flat). 
We assume t h a t  t h e  behavior of Nancy c o n s i s t s  on ly  i n  being 
h u r t f u l  t o  Mike, and t h a t  Mike knows it. (Ac tua l ly ,  we need 
on ly  t o  assume t h a t  Mike b e l i e v e s  t h a t  Nancy i s  n a s t y . )  So, 
# he a s s i g n s  t o  each s t r a t e g y  X E M  t h e  wors t  l o s s  f  ( x )  and he min- 
# imizes  it; t h e  s m a l l e s t  wors t  l o s s  i s  equa l  t o  v  . We a l s o  
assume t h a t  Mike behaves i n  t h e  same way, s o  t h a t  Nancy a s s i g n s  
b t o  each s t r a t e g y  Y E N  t h e  worst  g a i n  f  ( y )  and she  maximizes it: 
b b  # t h e  l a r g e s t  wors t  g a i n  i s  eaua l  t o  v  . Since  f  ( y )  f f  (x )  f o r  
a l l  x  E M I  y E PI, we deduce t h a t  
# There a r e  s i t u a t i o n s  where vb i s  s t r i c t l y  l e s s  t han  v  . 
Consider t h e  f i n i t e  game 
M = { 1 , 2 ) ,  N = ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) ,  f  i s  desc r ibed  by t h e  mat r ix  
1 
Nancy s e l e c t s  columns 
L ~ i k e  s e l e c t s  rows 
The e n t r i e s  of t h i s  ma t r ix  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  l o s s  of Mike. So, 
t h e  b i g g e s t  l o s s e s  of Mike a r e  2 and 4 r e s p e c t i v e l y  and t h u s ,  
Mike 's  conse rva t ive  s t r a t e g y  is  t h e  f i r s t  row and v# = 2 .  The 
l e a s t  g a i n s  f o r  Nancy a r e  r e s p e c t i v e l y  - 6 ,  -5, -4  and t h u s ,  h e r  
b  
conse rva t ive  s t r a t e g y  i s  t h e  t h i r d  column and v  = - 4 .  Let  u s  
t r y  t o  p l a y  t h a t  game fo r  our se lves .  
F i r s t ,  l e t  Mike implement i t s  conse rva t ive  s t r a t e g y  ( f i r s t  
row).  He expec t s  Nancy t o  choose t h e  second column. But t h e  
conse rva t ive  s t r a t e g y  f o r  Nancy i s  t h e  t h i r d  column and she ex- 
p e c t s  Mike t o  choose t h e  second row. But i f  Mike i s  informed of 
this choice (or guesses it), then we would do better to select 
his second row (with a loss of -4) instead of the first one. 
Similarly, if Mike chooses his conservative strategy, then Nancy 
would do better to play her second row (with a gain of 2) instead 
of the third. 
This "wheels within wheels" situation illustrates the lack 
of noncooperative equilibrium. The absence of noncooperative 
equilibria when vb < v# is actually a general fact. The follow- 
ing result shows that its existence requires very stringent 
conditions. 
Proposition 1 
The following conditions are equivalent 
- - 
i) (x,y) is a noncooperative equilibrium 
(1 0) ii) Y(X,Y)EMXN, f(F,y) - < f (Ffy) L f (x,y) 
# b b - # - [iii) v = v  = f  ( x ) = f  (y) . 
Definition 2 
When vb = vXf this common value is called the v a l u e  of the 
game and a noncooperative equilibrium is called a s a d d l e  point. 
There are examples where saddle points do exist. 
A 
Example 
Consider the finite game 
M = {1,2), N = {if2,3), f is described by the matrix 
We observe that v = -1 and that the pair of conservative stra- 
tegies (1,2) is a noncooperative equilibrium. 
THE M I N I M A X  THEOREMS 
W e  r e c a l l  t h a t  a  f u n c t i o n  f  i s  inf-compact i f  i t s  lower  
l e v e l  sets { x l f ( x )  - < A )  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  compact and t h a t  f  i s  lower  
semicont inuous  i f  i t s  lower  l e v e l  sets a r e  c l o s e d .  
Theorem 1 (lop-sided minimax). L e t  M and N be convex s u b s e t s  
of  v e c t o r  s p a c e s ,  M b e i n g  s u p p l i e d  w i t h  a  topo logy .  W e  assume 
t h a t  
i) Vy EN, x  + f ( x , y )  i s  convex and lower  semicon t inuous  
ii) 3 yo  EN such t h a t  x  + f  ( x , y o )  i s  in£-compact 
and t h a t  
(12)  YX EM, Y + f ( x t ~ )  i s  concave 
# Then f  h a s  a v a l u e  (vb  = v  ) and t h e r e  e x i s t s   EM such t h a t  
b  SUP f ( x , y )  = v  . A 
y m  
A s  a  c o r o l l a r y ,  w e  o b t a i n  t h e  von Neumann minimax Theorem (see 
von Neumann and Morgenstern  ( 1 9 4 4 ) ) .  
Theorem 2 (minimax). L e t  M and N be convex s u b s e t s  o f  v e c t o r  
s p a c e s ,  s u p p l i e d  w i t h  t o p o l o g i e s .  W e  assume t h a t  
i) Yy E  N ,  x  + f  ( x ,  y )  i s  convex and lower semicont inuous  
(13)  { 
,ii) 3 y O E N  such  t h a t  x + f ( x , y o )  i s  in£-compact 
and 
i) YxEM, y + f ( x , y )  i s  concave and upper semicon t inuous  
(14)  ) 
ii) EIx EM such  t h a t  y + f  ( x , y o )  0  i s  sup-compact. 
- - 
Then t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  s a d d l e  p o i n t  ( x , y )  EM x N .  
M I X E D  STRATEGIES 
W e  a l r e a d y  observed t h a t  games w i th  f i n i t e  s t r a t e g y  sets 
may n o t  have va lues .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a2p ly  t h e  minimax theorem, w e  
can convexify  t h e  s t r a t e g y  sets. Namely, l e t  N := ( 1 ,  ..., n )  and 
M := (1 ,  ..., m) be f i n i t e  sets.  Mike 's  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  f  i s  de f ined  
by t h e  ma t r ix  of  l o s s e s  f ( i , j ) ,  i E N ,  j  EM. W e  r ega rd  e lements  
of t h e  s implexes  
a s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  on N and P!. r e s p e c t i v e l y .  W e  ex tend  t h e  
f u n c t i o n  f  t o  t h e  f u n c t i o n  ? de f ined  on sn x sm by 
Theorem 2 imp l i e s  t h e  fo l lowing  c o r o l l a r y .  
CoroZZary  I .  A s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  s t r a t e g y  sets a r e  f i n i t e .  Then 
t h e r e  e x i s t  x E sn and E sm such t h a t  
J. von Neumann proposed t o  i n t e r p r e t  e lements  x  E sn and 
y  E sm a s  "mixed s t r a t e g i e s " .  I n  t h i s  framework, a  p l a y e r  does  
n o t  p l ay  a  s t r a t e g y ,  b u t  a l l  s t r a t e g i e s  and chooses  on ly  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  A j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  u se  of mixed s t r a t e g i e s  
i s  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  a  p l a y e r  o b t a i n s  by d i s g u i s i n g  h i s  o b j e c t i v e s  
t o  h i s  p a r t n e r .  By p l ay ing  a l l  s t r a t e g i e s  w i t h  a  g iven  prob- 
a b i l i t y ,  h i s  p a r t n e r  cannot  guess  t h e  s t r a t e g y  t h a t  he w i l l  
implement . 
RELAXATION OF THE COMPACTNESS ASSUMPTION 
The compactness assumption w e  made i n  Theorem 1, and,  sub- 
s equen t ly ,  i n  t h e  lop-s ided minimax Theorem 2 ,  happens t o  be t o o  
s t r o n g  i n  many problems. W e  s h a l l  r e l a x  it when M i s  a  s u b s e t  of  
a  Banach space.  
We consider two Banach spaces X and Y and a function from 
x x Y to IR := [-ar+m] . We set 
(17) M := { X E X I Y ~ E Y ,  I(xly) <+a) 
and 
- 
(1 8) N := { ~ E Y J v x E x , ~ ( x , ~ )  >-a . 
We shall say that M xN is the domain o f  F. 
We assume that M and N are n o n e m p t y ;  we set: 
(19) f is the restriction of to M x N . 
Thus, f maps M x N to IR . 
We begin by stating a corollary to Theorem 1 that uses the 
-* * 
conjugate functions f from X to I-m,+a] defined by 
Y 
N* N 




(21) Dom I* :=  EX Ify(p) Y 
C o r o l l a r y  2 .  We assume that X is a reflexive Banach space 
supplied with its weak topology. Theorem 1 remains true when we 
replace assumption ( 1 1 ) ii) by assumption 
4 4  
I a y o E N  such that OEInt(Dom f )(for the Yo 
* 
strong topology of the dual X ) .  
Assumption (22) can be considerably relaxed, as the follow- 
ing theorem shows. 
Theorem 3 ( r e l a x e d  l o p - s i d e d  minimax Theorem) .  Let X and Y 
be reflexive Banach spaces and 7 be a function from X x Y to 
whose domain M xN is nonempty. We assume that 
(23) Vy E N ,  x  + ? (x ,  y )  i s  convex lower semicontinuous,  
t h a t  
( 2 4 )  Vx E M ,  y  + ? ( x , y )  i s  concave upper semicontinuous,  
and t h a t  
0 E I n t  ( U Dom ?* )  ( f o r  t h e  s t r o n g  topology)  . 
YEN Y 
Then f  has  a  va lue  v  := vb = vt  and t h e r e  e x i s t s   EM such t h a t  
sup f ( x , y )  = v. (See Aubin (1979) ,  c h a p t e r  13 . )  
Y a  
PLAYING D E C I S I O N  RULES 
Le t  M and N be t h e  s t r a t e g y  s e t s  of  Mike and Nancy and f  be 
Nancy's g a i n  f u n c t i o n .  She can u se  it t o  a s s i g n  t o  each  d e c i s i o n  
r u l e  CN : M + N  a  g a i n  d e f i n e d  by 
Th i s  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  w o r s t  g a i n  she  can expec t  us ing  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
r u l e  C N I  assuming t h a t  N.ike1s behavior  i s  noncooperat ive .  
Note t h a t  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  
of t h e  wors t  g a i n  y i e l d e d  by a  s t r a t e g y  7, regarded a s  a  c o n s t a n t  
d e c i s i o n  r u l e  x  + y :  
b  - - f  (y )  := i n £  f ( x , y )  = i n f  f ( x , y ( x ) )  . 
x a 1  x  GnI 
Consequently,  i f  CN i s  a  s e t  of con t inuous  d e c i s i o n  r u l e s  con- 
t a i n i n g  t h e  s e t  N of c o n s t a n t  d e c i s i o n  r u l e s ,  
I b  vb := sup i n f  f  ( x ,y )  - < sup f  (cN) YEN x€M C ~ E C ~  ( 2 7 )  
< i n £  sup f ( x , y )  := v  # I - xEM yRJ 
Symmetrical ly,  Mike a s s i g n s  t o  each d e c i s i o n  r u l e  C : N  + M  t h e  M 
wors t  l o s s  
# f (C,) := sup f (C, (y) , y) . 
YEN 
If CM is a set of continuous decision rules containing the set 
M of constant decision rules, we have 
We shall present a set of assumptions (weaker than the assump- 
tions of Theorem 2) under which 
# b inf f (CM) = sup f (CN) . 
C E CM M C ECN N 
Theorem 4. Let M be a topological space, N be a convex sub- 
set of a topological vector space and f be a function from M xN 
to IR . Let us suppose that 
i) 3 yo E N  such that x + f (x, yo) is inf-compact 
(30) [ 
ii) Yy EN, x + f (x, y) is lower semicontinuous 
and that 
(31 YX EM, y +f(x,~) is concave. 
Let CM := C(N,M) and CN:=C(MIN) denote the set of continuous 
decision rules of Mike and Nancy. Then there exists ZEN such 
that 
sup f(X,y) = v # 
- 
I Y = inf SUP f(CY(y) ,Y) ( 3 2 )  CM E CM YEM I = sup inf f(x,CN(x)) 
C~ C~ xEN 
(See Aubin (1 979) , chapter 7. ) 
T h i s  i s  a v e r y  p o w e r f u l  theorem,  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  Brouwer f i x e d  
p o i n t  Theorem and a l l  t h e  many e a u i v a l e n t  r e s u l t s  of  n o n l i n e a r  
a n a l y s i s .  A consequence  o f  it i s  t h e  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  Ky F a n ' s  
i n e q u a l i t y  (Ky Fan ( 1 9 7 2 ) ) .  I t  happens  t h a t  it i s  a more v e r s a -  
t i l e  t o o l  of  n o n l i n e a r  a n a l y s i s  t h a n  t h e  Brouwer o r  Schauder  
f i x e d  p o i n t  t heorems  o r  t h e  Kaku tan i  f i x e d  p o i n t  theorem.  (See  
Aubin ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  c h a p t e r s  8 ,  9 and 15 . )  
Theorem 5 (Ky Fan) .  L e t  K be  a compact convex o f  a  t o p o l o g -  
i c a l  v e c t o r  s p a c e  and  V : K  x K + I R  be a f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f y i n g  
i) Vy E K t  x + y ( x ,  y )  i s  l ower  s e m i c o n t i n u o u s  
( 3 3 )  
ii) Vx E K ,  y + V(x,y) i s  concave .  
Then t h e r e  e x i s t s  ~ E K  s a t i s f y i n g  
( 3 4 )  sup  p (X,y )  5 SUP Y ( Y I Y )  
YEK YEK 
THE FINITE TOPOLOGY 
S t i l l ,  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  a p p a r e n t  g e n e r a l i t y ,  a s sumpt ion  (33)  i) 
of  Ky F a n ' s  Theorem i s  n o t  s a t i s f i e d  i n  s e v e r a l  i n s t a n c e s .  W e  
s h a l l  r e p l a c e  it by a n o t h e r  set  o f  a s s u m p t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  
f i n i t e  topoZogy, which i s  n o t  g e n e r a l l y  a v e c t o r  s p a c e  t o p o l o g y ,  
b u t  which i s  s t r o n g e r  t h a n  any v e c t o r  s p a c e  t o p o l o g y .  L e t  N b e  
a  convex s u b s e t  of  a v e c t o r  s p a c e .  
we a s s o c i a t e  w i t h  any  f i n i t e  set  K := y l , . . . , y n  of  n  
e l e m e n t s  y i  o f  N t h e  map BK from sn t o  N d e f i n e d  by 
The f i n i t e  topozogy on  a convex s u b s e t  N i s  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  t o p o l o g y  
f o r  which t h e  maps BK a r e  c o n t i n u o u s  when K r a n g e s  o v e r  t h e  f a m i l y  
S o f  f i n i t e  s u b s e t s  o f  N .  
A 
So,  a  map C from N ,  s u p p l i e d  w i t h  t h e  f i n i t e  t o p o l o g y ,  t o  
a t o p o l o g i c a l  s p a c e  M i s  c o n t i n u o u s ,  i f  and o n l y  i f  
(36 VK ES, t h e  maps CBK from sn t o  M a r e  con t inuous .  
Also ,  any map C from a  t o p o l o g i c a l  space  M t o  N of  t h e  form 
where 6 i s  a  con t inuous  map from M t o  sn, i s  cont inuous  from M 
t o  N s u p p l i e d  w i t h  t h e  f i n i t e  topology.  Any a f f i n e  map from a  
convex se t  M t o  a  convex set  N i s  cont inuous  when t h e y  a r e  bo th  
supp l i ed  w i th  t h e  f i n i t e  topology.  
W e  begin  by g e n e r a l i z i n g  Theorem 4 .  
Theorem 4 bis. Theorem 4 ho lds  t r u e  when N i s  s u p p l i e d  w i t h  
t h e  f i n i t e  topology.  
A 
W e  now p r e s e n t  an  i n e q u a l i t y  due t o  ~ r g z i s - N i r e n b e r g -  
Stampacchia (1973) which is very  u s e f u l  i n  t h e  t h e o r y  of  mono- 
t one  o p e r a t o r s .  
Theorem 6 (Ky Fan's inequality for monotone functions). 
L e t  K C X  be a  convex s u b s e t  of  a  t o p o l o g i c a l  v e c t o r  space  and 
P : K x K -t lR be a  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f y i n g  
r i) Vy E K ,  x  + Y(x, y )  i s  lower semicontinuous 
I f o r  t h e  f i n i t e  topology i ii) VX E K , y  + ' Q ( x ~ Y )  i s  concave and upper  ! semicont inuous  
W e  a l s o  assume t h a t  
(39)  3 y  E K such t h a t  x  + P(x ,yo)  i s  in£-compact 0 
and t h a t  'f' i s  "monotone" i n  t h e  s ense  t h a t  
Then t h e r e  e x i s t s  ~ E K  s u c h  t h a t  
( 4 1  s u p  '4(x,y)  - < 0 
YEK 
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